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Executive Summary
The modern food industry is characterized by 
fewer and fewer firms and the emergence of some 
powerful international and global players. This case 
study of Alia Foods details that firm's development 
from its origins in local dairy cooperatives to its 
current position as a multinational food conglom­
erate. Its development has attracted scrutiny from 
competition authorities for a variety of reasons, 
and it raises questions about the role of farmer 
cooperatives locally, nationally, and internationally.
Some technical terms are examined in support of 
the case study: consolidation, concentration, and 
market power are often used interchangeably, but 
from an economic and policy perspective they are 
quite different and have a variety of origins. The 
case study also outlines some current policy con­
cerns about horizontal and vertical relationships in 
food marketing chains. Aria exhibits a range of 
vertical and horizontal relationships with various 
sets of stakeholders, and their actual and potential 
interests are described and discussed in policy 
terms. Aria dominates its supply of raw material 
[milk], but its status as a cooperative would be 
expected to protect its farmer-suppliers. As Aria's 
influence has crossed borders through exports and 
collaboration with other firms in processing and 
distribution, other farmers may suffer, along with 
the dairy-processing firms to which they sell. As 
for other food processors, Aria faces powerful 
trading partners among Europe's retailers that have 
themselves attracted attention from policy makers.
In identifying and evaluating policy options, 
economists face a number of challenges, including 
variable definitions [of, for example, markets and 
products], difficulties in empirical measurement 
[particularly of market power], and modeling prac­
tices. Economic interests have shifted over time, 
and a "channel" orientation has developed in some 
food industries, changing the practices food indus­
try firms use within those channels. Many such 
developments are difficult for policy to address, 
and this issue has relevance for Aria Foods.
Your assignment is to suggest policy recommenda­
tions for the various levels of government [local 
Danish and British governments, national Danish 
and Swedish governments, and the European 
Commission] regarding the future of Aria Foods
and other large agribusiness firms. You will need to 
assess the extent of market power exercised by 
Aria and decide which stakeholders are likely to be 
affected by Aria's exercise of market power and in 
which ways.
Background
The number of food industry firms has declined 
across most commodity sectors and in most coun­
tries of the world. This decline has been widely 
associated with a presumed increase in the market 
power of the largest firms and with the abuse of 
that power. Owing to the public sentiments asso­
ciated with such issues as the pursuit of profit, the 
price and availability of food, rural and village life, 
and farm incomes, market power in the food indus­
try has been of considerable concern to policy 
makers. The connection between structural change 
in the food industry and the possible development 
and abuse of market power is, however, complex. 
This case study examines the forces at work, their 
potential impacts, and policy responses to them. 
Aria Foods is a Scandinavian food industry firm 
that has passed through various stages of growth 
to enjoy near monopoly-monopsony status and 
attracted the attention of the evolving regulatory 
environment in Scandinavia and Europe.
Consolidation and Concentration
In many countries the number of food industry 
firms has declined and the average size of firms has 
increased in a process known as consolidation 
[Baker 2003; Traill and Gilpin 1994; USDA 2002], 
As consolidation has proceeded, a few firms have 
increased market share more than the remaining 
firms through the process of concentration 
[Rogers 2001], Economists' assumption of many 
small, price-taking firms might be maintained in the 
presence of some consolidation, as firms become 
somewhat larger but each still has an equal and 
negligible influence in the market. Concentration, 
however, delivers a small subset of very large firms 
with the potential to exert greater influence over 
prices and trading conditions than their smaller 
counterparts. Concentration has been shown to 
occur in both input markets and product markets 
and at ail stages of the food marketing chain.
"Concentration" is sometimes used interchangeably 
with "market power," whereas in fact neither term 
implies the other.
Theoretical and Empirical Issues
On the surface, measurement of consolidation may 
appear straightforward in that it entails tracking 
numbers of firms, whereas measurement of concen­
tration seems more challenging because market 
shares must be derived. In fact, measurement of 
both can be difficult for both product markets and 
for the often overlooked markets within which 
inputs are purchased. The first measurement prob­
lem concerns product and market definition: large 
firms tend to purchase, produce, and sell many 
different products in a variety of forms, formats, 
and quality levels. The emerging dominance of non- 
specialized retail formats [Stensrud 1999] has 
exacerbated this problem. A second problem con­
fronts markets with significant volumes of interna­
tional trade: calculating and interpreting a firm's 
domestic market share is complex if the firm sells 
in foreign markets or if the domestic market 
features many products produced by foreign firms. 
The third measurement problem involves inter­
actions between products: a concentrated market 
for one product can have significant implications 
for related products that involve the same, or dif­
ferent, firms.
A fourth measurement problem is the identification 
of products within firms, and firms within markets. 
In the former case, vertical integration has the 
effect of reducing marketing volumes because at 
one or more points in the marketing chain 
products are not traded but retained within a single 
firm. In the latter case, associations between small 
firms may mimic the market power-related aspects 
of large firms, although the firms themselves each 
trade small volumes. A familiar example is the 
farmer cooperative, but equally significant is the 
agglomeration of retailers and/or wholesalers into 
"buyer groups" for the purposes of negotiations 
with suppliers [UK Competition Commission 
2000], Finally, empirical measures of consolidation 
and concentration have almost always been used 
and interpreted with regard to product markets. 
These two processes are equally important, how­
ever, and perhaps even more influential, in input 
markets.
Misuse of market power is grounded in firms' 
restricting traded quantities in order to raise sales 
prices or reduce purchase prices. This understand­
ing emerges from economic theory of monopoly 
and oligopoly and is at the core of a set of empiri­
cal techniques that seek to detect the influence of 
large firms' decisions and actions on the market. 
These techniques include direct approaches such as 
measuring or inferring differences between price 
and marginal cost [P = MC in perfect competition] 
and finding a statistical association between market 
volumes and price that otherwise violates the com­
petitive model. More crudely, measures of profit 
[or proxy measures] have been statistically asso­
ciated with market volumes and specific known cost 
items. Less direct approaches involve observation of 
prices at different points in the food marketing 
chain over time and examination of the timing and 
extent of the transmission of price changes 
between stages. Observations of series of prices 
and market volumes have also been used in game 
theoretic models. Most of these methods seek to 
detect market power and its misuse at the market 
level rather than say anything about the actions of 
the individual firm.
The Forces at Work
Technology. Consolidation is likely to be partly 
attributable to technological change, both internal 
and external to the firm. Economies of scale often 
apply in cases of large investment items within the 
firm, like high-technology processing systems, 
information technology [particularly those that are 
bar code-based], packaging systems, logistics, and 
brand-based marketing. Economies of scale also 
apply to non-investment-related items such as 
promotion and market research. Technological 
forces external to the firm include the availability 
of reduced transport costs and rapid advances in 
information technologies.
Policy has also interacted with technology in the 
food industry. Regulation of food safety, environ­
mental actions, and product labeling are likely to 
favor larger firms because they are better able to 
exercise economies of scale [Siebert et al. 2000], 
These influences have increased market areas and 
reduced large firms' unit costs relative to those of 
small firms. Many such advantages apply first and 
foremost at the firm level, rather than at the level 
of the individual shop, processing plant, or ware­
house, thus providing the incentives for the
formation of chains without necessarily reducing 
the numbers of establishments [Marsden et al. 
1998).
Consumer Habits. At the retail level, consumer 
shopping habits have changed to reflect changing 
lifestyles and income, as well as transport avail­
ability and changing dietary preferences [Kinsey 
and Senauer 1996). Changing consumer habits have 
invoked changes in both the format and degree of 
specialization of shops. In many countries spe­
cialized shops have given way to nonspecialized 
stores, and mall-type retail clusters have appeared. 
With the growth in the importance of non­
specialized shops, the measurement of retail-level 
variables such as concentration, costs, and profits 
has become impossible for researchers and regula­
tory authorities.
Demand for information by consumers has led to 
substantial pressure on food industry firms to 
create systems and services that can measure, 
process, and deliver information to the consumer. 
Labeling and test certification address the content 
of foods, and identity preservation ["traceability") 
and process certification address the path taken by 
the product. In both cases, it is likely that large 
firms with large volumes can better serve the 
customer than their smaller competitors.
Channel Development. Consolidation and concen­
tration have fostered linkages downstream toward 
retailers and upstream toward farmers so that a 
smaller number of channels to the consumer are 
available. The emergence of channels has led to new 
practices between agents in the food marketing 
chain, particularly long-term contracts featuring 
rigorous application of privately specified standards 
[Hughes 2002). In the context of market power, 
channel practices may favor the emergence of 
"chain captains" [Connor 2003) who, although 
they are active at just one stage of the chain, man­
age to control, and possibly exploit, agents at all 
stages of the chain. The predisposing conditions 
for channel captaincy have been referred to as 
"food convergence" [Cotterill 1997) and have been 
recognized in two forms, both of which are asso­
ciated with the modern use of marketing tech­
niques that feature brands:
• The "U.S. model" of food convergence 
features food processors as chain captains. 
Market power is exercised by supply of
globally or nationally well-known brands 
without which no supermarket can 
operate.
• The "British model" emphasizes retail 
power, exercised by restricted access to 
supermarket shelf space, downward pres­
sure on prices paid to suppliers, and the 
use of retailers' own-label brands in com­
petition with processors' brands.
The implications of food convergence generally 
arise from the smaller number of market partici­
pants and their close vertical linkages in the food 
chain. Such linkages allow not only for supply con­
tracts, but also for provision of large amounts of 
information. This situation enables traceability and 
differentiation of products according to issues such 
as animal housing conditions or crops' pesticide 
history, and for specification of features such as 
packaging and timing for delivery.
Mergers. Mergers and acquisitions, which occur as 
firms that have increased their market share are 
purchased and combined with other "winning" 
firms, have acted as driving forces in food industry 
consolidation. Wrigley [2001) notes that merger 
activity increased among food retailers in Britain in 
the 1980s and 1990s and followed in the United 
States in the late 1990s. Wrigley [1997) rejects the 
concept of separate British and U.S. models of food 
convergence. Instead, he identifies several factors 
determining the intercontinental difference, 
particularly the policy environment, the availability 
of venture capital, applications in information tech­
nologies, and the entry of Wal-Mart into food 
retailing. Several commentators have noted the 
increasing number of cross-border mergers in the 
food industry [see, for example, UK Competition 
Commission 2000), and this phenomenon is 
reflected in this case study of Aria.
Vertical Integration. Vertical integration in the 
food industry has been examined in many con­
texts—specifically, farming and processing, 
processing and distribution, distribution and 
retailing, and processing and retailing. Reasons 
behind vertical integration include overcoming 
difficulties in acquiring and processing information 
[Hennessy 1996), reducing the cost or awkwardness 
of transactions [Azzam 1996), and enhancing the 
compatibility of technologies and scale between
upstream and downstream stages of the food 
marketing chain.
Social Change. A t the farm level, reduced numbers 
of farms and increases in farm size have been 
accompanied by greater and more widespread 
specialization and an increasing tendency for 
farmers to be employed off the farm [Brouwer and 
Bijman 2001). In general, consolidation of farms has 
not been viewed as a competition-related issue. In 
some commodity sectors, however, contracting and 
other transaction mechanisms have been used to 
effect significant local concentration and raise 
concerns about market access. In Western econo­
mies, pork and poultry production provide exam­
ples. In an African and Latin American context, 
contract production of flowers and vegetables for 
multinational food industry firms has also been 
criticized for dominating and marginalizing tradi­
tional producers.
Urban Location. Location of establishments has 
played a role, as the growth in the size of retail 
stores and processing plants has meant that an 
increasing number of locations are capable of sus­
taining just one establishment. Indeed, control of 
potential sites for retail food stores outside British 
towns has itself become the subject of anti- 
monopoly action [UK Competition Commission 
2000).
Innovation. Innovation is thought to be related to 
market concentration, although opinions vary 
about the nature of the relationship. According to 
some researchers and theorists, perfectly competi­
tive markets would not offer sufficient returns to 
firms to justify the costs incurred in innovation 
[Braadland 2000). This view particularly refers to 
new product development in the context of price­
taking firms. The alternative view is that a 
monopoly provides no incentive for innovation 
owing to lack of competition [Harris 2002). 
Product differentiation and new product develop­
ment are apparent on the supermarket shelves, 
although the extent to which this innovation is 
greater or less than it would be in a non-concen- 
trated food industry has not been adequately 
researched.
M uni testations of Market Power
Economists' approach to market power in the food 
industry has traditionally focused on the impact of
monopoly actions on the consumer. Real food 
prices paid by consumers have continued to fall in 
most developed markets, however, and little 
evidence of monopoly-related welfare loss to con­
sumers has appeared [Hyde and Perloff 1998; 
Kinsey 2003; Park and Weliwheta 1996). A more 
recent focus has been on the body of the food 
chain, particularly the transactions between proces­
sors, distributors, and retailers.
Retail Behavior. Retailers' behavior toward suppliers 
has attracted considerable recent attention. A 
variety of tests have been employed for monop­
sony action whereby retailers limit the volume they 
demand to drive prices downward. Economic 
modeling centered on methods developed in the 
“new empirical industrial organization" approach 
has yielded tests for monopoly and monopsony 
simultaneously (for a review see Digal and Ahmadi- 
Esfahani 2002). As already noted, such studies 
employ market-level data and do not deal directly 
with single firms' conduct.
Specific actions by retailers toward suppliers have 
come under scrutiny in the context of retailers as 
"gatekeepers" owing to their apparent control of 
the interface between consumers and the rest of 
the food industry (UK Competition Commission 
2000). There are many examples of such actions 
(see also McCorriston and Sheldon 1997; OECD 
1999). Among other things, retailers
• pass on to suppliers the costs of new retail 
product introduction (such as initial adver­
tising costs);
• demand payments from processors for 
access to supermarket shelf space (known 
as "slotting fees");
• price some basic products below cost to 
increase sales of complementary high- 
margin products ("loss-leading");
• require agreements with suppliers to be on 
an all-or-nothing basis across a range of 
products (so-called "de-listing threat");
• require compensation from suppliers for 
products' commercial failure;
• require suppliers to play technical roles 
(such as physical stocking of shelves);
• demand exclusive supply agreements; and
• require coordination with retailers' use of 
own-label brands.
Retailers' use of own-label brands is not generally 
thought of as a direct consequence of concentra­
tion, but it is clearly enabled by retailers' scale and 
their desire to add value in terms of shoppers' 
desire for convenience. The extent to which 
retailers exploit food-processing firms that supply 
their own-label brand products is not clear.
A key element of food retailers' strategies is their 
location within a catchment of customers. Several 
locational trends have been observed, including 
moves outside town centers and location within 
shopping malls, often in combination. Owing to the 
limited number of suitable ["greenfield"] sites, 
retailers have the incentive to purchase or occupy 
as many sites as possible, not only to open a store, 
but also to prevent entry by a rival food retailer.
Processing. Most early studies of food processors' 
market power focused on the U.S. meat industry, 
particularly the measurement of the market power 
of processors and how they exercised it over 
retailers on the one hand [for example, Morrison 
2001] and feedlot owners on the other [for exam­
ple, Schroeter and Azzam 1990],
According to the "food convergence" line of 
reasoning, food processors' must-stock brands are 
supplied to retailers under monopoly conditions. 
The most obvious abuse of this position would be 
restriction of supply to drive up wholesale prices. 
A range of other practices has been proposed, 
however, including "tying" of must-stock brands to 
other products the processor sells and exclusivity 
arrangements.
Logistics and distribution have also been employed 
in exercising market power. In some cases proces­
sors have supplied bulk containers, chillers and 
freezers, and display cases to retailers with the 
requirement that retailers use these items to 
handle, store, or display only that processor's 
products.
Researchers have examined the subject of brands as 
an instrument of market power in some depth and 
detail for the case of breakfast cereals in the United 
States. Connor [1999] observes that the industry 
supplying such products is highly concentrated, 
and the few firms in the market own a very large 
number of brands. Connor argues that this situa­
tion is anti-competitive because it raises barriers to 
entry, as potential new entrants face incumbent
brands at all sites within the "product space" 
despite the non-profitability of most of those 
incumbent brands.
Processors' relations with retailers clearly vary from 
product to product. In the case of retail beer in 
Britain, firms in the highly concentrated brewing 
industry own a large proportion of the pubs. These 
pubs are commonly leased to agents under a set of 
arrangements that have been criticized for their 
pricing practices, exclusivity of product supply and 
tying, and constraints on lessees' management free­
dom [UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
1989],
The concept of exploitation of farmers by monop- 
sonistic food processors and buyers is an old 
theme. Collusive arrangements have been portrayed 
as the main instrument of placing downward pres­
sure on the prices received by farmers. Other 
potential instruments include
• processor control of key inputs [like 
water, transport, credit, seeds];
• tying of input supply to purchase of 
products; and
• requirement for purchase of high-invest- 
ment items on the farm [such as pipe sizes 
for milk collection that are not compatible 
with rival buyers' equipment].
Farmer Cooperatives. One of the main justifications 
for farmer cooperation is the accumulation of 
countervailing market power against the potential 
monopsonistic actions of processors and other 
buyers at the farm gate. The essential nature of a 
cooperative is a consolidation of product [or input, 
or service] from many farmer-members. The exclu­
sion of nonmember suppliers and the requirement 
that members sell exclusively to the cooperative has 
been interpreted in some contexts as anticompeti­
tive.
In the meat and dairy industries, many processors 
are vertically integrated farmer cooperatives. These 
cooperatives operate as large food processors and 
employ the full range of sophisticated processing 
and marketing techniques. In recent decades the 
trend in most countries has been toward consolida­
tion of cooperatives. In some cases single coopera­
tives now approach 100 percent shares in milk and 
livestock purchases, perhaps spanning more than
one country. Aside from concerns about monop­
oly and monopsony behavior, such concentration 
presents a barrier to entry by other firms. Many of 
these concerns have been raised with regard to 
Aria Foods.
Single Seller Desks. In some countries national-level 
agencies have been assigned a state-authorized 
monopoly in marketing export products. The 
objective is usually related to farm income, but the 
procedure faces criticism from some circles as a 
market distortion. The argument runs that the 
monopsony and monopoly status of these agencies 
removes their incentive to supply products into 
differentiated markets. Obviously, the most 
strident opposition to single selling desks comes 
from independent traders that are excluded from 
the market.
Input Suppliers. Suppliers of farm inputs, animal 
feeds, and feed and food ingredients often operate 
in highly concentrated industries. The extent to 
which they exercise monopoly power over their 
customers has not been studied in detail, but this 
concern lies at the heart of concerns over patent­
ing and other intellectual property attached to 
products or components based on living organisms.
Case Study: Aria Foods
Aria Foods is a cooperative owned by 10,000 
Danish and Swedish dairy farmers. Including its 84 
subsidiaries [as of September 2005], it is Europe's 
second-largest dairy company, with milk purchases 
of 8.4 billion kilograms and DKK 46 billion sales in 
fiscal year 2004/05 [Aria Foods 2006a, b]. It was 
formed in 2000 by the merger of two dairy coop­
eratives: MD Foods [Danish] and Aria [Swedish], 
The stated purpose of the merger was to match 
and counter the size of the large international 
retailing chains that were, and remain, its customer 
base. MD Foods had a long history of growth by 
merger with other cooperatives as far back as 1970 
and including the 1999 merger with the then 
second-largest dairy cooperative, Klover Maelk. 
Foreign acquisition was also a longstanding feature 
of MD's strategy, beginning with the purchase of 
Associated Fresh Foods [the United Kingdom's 
fifth-largest dairy company] in 1990. At the merger 
in 2000, MD Foods purchased 90 percent of all 
Danish cows' milk, and Aria, some 65 percent of 
Sweden's.
As a result of rising imports of cheaper German 
milk, Aria's share of the Danish liquid milk market 
fell from 89 percent in 2003 to 80 percent in 
2006. It has been suggested that Aria's market 
share has also suffered owing to consumer reaction 
to recent legal action over its abuse of dominant 
market position [Food and Drink Europe 2006], 
Aria still holds a large market share in Denmark for 
most dairy products, including yogurt [75 percent], 
cheese (55 percent], and all organic dairy products 
(75 percent]. The United Kingdom, however, is the 
group's biggest market, accounting for 33 percent 
of company sales, followed by Denmark (22 
percent] and Sweden (19 percent]. Aria's UK sub­
sidiary (Aria Foods pic, formed in 2003 through a 
merger with Express Dairies] is that country's 
largest supplier of liquid milk. Outside Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, Aria Foods 
operates numerous subsidiaries, with production 
facilities in Argentina, Brazil, Poland, and Saudi 
Arabia and licensed production in Canada and the 
United States.
Aria Foods spans the full range of dairy products, 
including liquid milk [45 percent of turnover], 
cheese [25 percent], powder and preserved milk 
products [14 percent], and butter and spreads [11 
percent]. Strong brand names are employed, 
including Lurpak (originally Danish, but now the 
United Kingdom's leading butter brand], 
Rosenborg mold cheeses, Buko cream cheeses, and 
DANO full-fat powdered products [with substantial 
market share in Asian and Middle Eastern markets]. 
Through a number of subsidiary companies, Aria 
markets fruit juices and other beverages, bacterial 
cultures, and food ingredients. In the United 
Kingdom, Aria Foods has a partnership with 
Fonterra [a New Zealand dairy company, also coop­
erative-based] for packaging and distribution of 
butter and other spreadables that uses Fonterra's 
Anchor brand. For import and distribution on the 
Chinese market, Aria Foods has a joint venture 
with Mengnui [China's leading dairy company]. In 
addition to its branded product range, Aria 
produces retailers' own-label branded products.
Both Aria Foods and its predecessor entities faced 
scrutiny from Swedish competition authorities 
during the series of mergers that led to the current 
corporate arrangements (Danish Competition 
Authority 2000b; OECD 2004], The 1999 merger 
of MD Foods and Klover Maelk was subject to the 
following requirements of the Danish Competition
Authority (Danish Competition Authority 1999, 
2000a, 2004a, b]:
• Farmers' level of choice was to be 
enhanced by reducing the duration of the 
supply commitment and permitting 
farmers to supply up to 20 percent to 
other buyers.
• All competitors were to be permitted to 
purchase raw milk and cream from MD 
Foods, and the company was obliged to 
buy excess milk from other Danish dairies.
• MD Foods was required to divest itself of 
annual processing capacity of 180 million 
kilograms of milk (entailing sale of a 
specified subsidiary company to a Danish 
competitor).
• MD Foods was prohibited from real estate 
arrangements that restricted entry by 
prohibition of use of land or facilities in 
dairy processing.
• MD Foods was compelled to allow 
competitors' access to distribution 
facilities.
Notably, the conditions imposed on MD Foods 
were not backed up by specified penalties for 
noncompliance. The Danish Minister for Commerce 
and Industry imposed several restrictions on MD 
Foods and the new conglomerate Aria Foods but 
did not refer to case to European Union (EU) 
Competition Authorities (Danish Competition 
Authority 2000a). The summary of the situation 
given by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) was that 
Denmark lacked an appropriate legal framework to 
deal with the case (OECD 2004). Although Swedish 
competition authorities had previously prevented 
Aria's mergers with other Swedish cooperatives 
(Eurofood 2000), they too gave an affirmative final 
judgment on the merger with MD Foods. The 
following strictures were imposed (Danish 
Competition Authority 2004a):
• further MD Foods divestiture of
processing capacity to competitors;
• Aria Foods' provision for competitors' 
access to Aria Foods' distribution system; 
and
• Aria Foods' commitment to selling or buy­
ing milk and cream to and from other 
dairies.
The merger between Aria Foods and Express 
Dairies was referred to the European Commission, 
which concluded that the merger did not threaten 
to create, or reinforce, a dominant market position 
with regard to raw milk. The merger was also 
dependent on a general meeting of Express Dairies' 
shareholders in April 2003. The European Com­
mission referred the matter to the competition 
authorities in seven countries in which the merger 
may have threatened competition regarding 
processed dairy products (European Commission 
2003). The UK competition authorities concluded 
that there was no threat to the public interest, and 
the deal was approved by the United Kingdom's 
Office of Fair Trading. Notably, the UK regulator 
stated that the market power of retailers in the UK 
was sufficient to offset the effects of the merger 
(UK Competition Commission 2003).
In late 2006 Aria Foods acquired 30 percent of 
the Finnish dairy company Ingman Foods, with an 
option on the balance of shares. This action 
received approval from EU competition authorities 
(Aria Foods 2007).
In 2002 EU competition authorities approved a 
joint venture between Aria Foods' packaging sub­
sidiary (Danapak), the Austrian Teich 
Aktiengesellschaft Partnership, and Danish Corona 
Packaging. This joint venture created one of 
Northern Europe's largest manufacturers of flexible 
packaging (Aria Foods 2002). The European Com­
mission concluded that because of the many end 
uses of flexible packaging (that is, not just for dairy 
products), there was no risk of emergence of a 
dominant position for the new firm (European 
Commission 2002).
In a Danish court decision of February 10, 2006, 
Aria Foods was fined DKK 5 million for abuse of a 
dominant position in fresh milk and fermented 
products under the Danish Competition Act of 
2002 (Danish Competition Authority 2006a). Aria 
had agreed to pay its (retailer) customer Metro to 
exclude the products of Aria's competitor Hirtshals 
Andelsmejeri. Although Aria denies any wrong­
doing (Aria Foods 2006c), the court received 
evidence that Metro revoked its contract with 
Hirtshals in association with Aria's financial
contribution to Metro's 40th anniversary celebra­
tions. This decision marked the first time a Danish 
court concluded that a company abused a domi­
nant position. A later confidential settlement 
between the two firms was reached, involving a 
payment from Aria to Hirtshals [Aria Foods 
2006d).
Until 2004 Aria Foods charged new dairy supplier- 
members an entry fee equal to 2 percent of the 
value [at basic price] of milk to be supplied. Three 
Danish dairy farmers brought this matter to the 
Danish court, alleging abuse of a dominant position. 
In August 2002 the Danish Competition Authority 
ruled that Aria Foods had abused its dominant 
position in procurement of Danish cows' milk, on 
the grounds that the fee exceeded fair compensa­
tion to Aria for the costs of admission. In 
November 2003 the Danish Competition Appeals 
Tribunal overturned the decision, finding that it 
had not contained sufficient description and analy­
sis of the salient facts. Furthermore, the Appeals 
Tribunal stated that a high fee alone does not con­
stitute evidence of abuse of a dominant position. 
The farmers took the case to the Danish High 
Court, which dismissed it in September 2006 
(Danish Competition Authority 2006b].
In 2004 the Danish Competition Authority con­
cluded that the series of mergers between, first, 
Klover Maalk and MD Foods, and later MD Foods 
and Aria, had led to higher Danish milk prices than 
would otherwise have prevailed. The authority 
stated that under the current legal regime the 
mergers would probably not have been permitted 
(Danish Competition Authority 2004b, 284], Fur­
ther concerns have arisen over Aria's market power 
as a supplier to retailers and as a distributor of 
other firms' products to retailers [Danish Competi­
tion Authority 2004b, Chapter 5], but in several 
instances Aria was found not to have abused its 
dominant position, particularly with regard to 
pricing and marketing support in dealing with re­
tailers (Danish Competition Authority 2002],
Policy Issues
General Comments
The primary policy concerns provoked by concen­
tration in the food industry are the protection, 
promotion, and preservation of competition. Most 
countries feature two forms of policy:
• antimonopoly policy targets firms' pricing 
and practices that exercise market power; 
and
• antitrust policy addresses relations among 
firms, to prevent or punish mergers and 
other forms of association that provide for 
the exercise of market power.
Increasing consolidation and concentration has led 
to a shift in policy interest away from monopoly 
and toward a balance of market power between 
stages of the marketing chain. This shift is not new: 
U.S. law has allowed farmers' collusive actions (such 
as in a cooperative] to enable "countervailing 
market power" (relative to that of the large food 
processors to whom the farmers sell] as far back as 
the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922. This vertically 
oriented interest in bilateral market power has 
recently extended to relationships between retailers 
and other stages of the food marketing chain.
Policy concern about access to markets, which is 
traditionally protected by antitrust policy that pro­
hibits collusion and exclusivity agreements, has 
been transformed into concern over access to 
channels. Food convergence means that fewer 
channels are available to firms, and access to these 
channels is often predicated upon adherence to 
quality standards, information provision, or other 
actions by suppliers. A further complicating feature 
is that channel trade tends to be driven by con­
tracts rather than interactions in a transparent 
market. This situation limits the extent to which 
policy agencies can monitor trading conditions.
To the extent that channel access and food conver­
gence require and result in specialization on the 
farm, then concentration can be associated with 
farmers' risk management. The ageless risk-related 
practice of diversification must then be abandoned, 
and policy makers must ensure that alternative 
mechanisms are available.
Channel access requisites such as standards, 
product descriptions, food safety, information pro­
vision, certification, labor arrangements, animal 
welfare, and political (and even religious] commit­
ments are to one degree or another parallel 
requirements to those of most governments. They 
are defined and imposed by private agents, how­
ever, which challenges traditional thinking about 
the role of government and private enterprise. 
Currently there are few indications of which, if any,
within-channel practices actually discourage entry 
or otherwise exclude entry by farmers on a non­
competitive basis. While farmers that gain channel 
access can certainly benefit from it, they have the 
incentive to minimize the number of other farmers 
that benefit alongside them.
The gatekeeping role of retailers gives rise to 
several concerns. First, as the controllers of super­
market shelf space, retailers effectively determine 
the range and form of products on sale. In addi­
tion, retailers' own-label brands compete for shelf 
space and in most countries have steadily accumu­
lated market share. Consumer groups have raised 
concerns over the possible decline in product 
variety, specifically a reduced number of brands on 
sale and the disappearance of local or traditional 
brands from the market. That tendency is exacer­
bated by supermarkets' increasing sales of nonfood 
items and ready-to-eat foods, which are recognized 
as the fast-growing market segments. Many authors 
have observed the decline of "second-tier" brands, 
possibly as a consequence of these trends.
As old brands and products disappear from shop 
shelves, a second set of gatekeeping concerns 
addresses the appearance of new ones. Several 
authors have made the case that some actions of 
retailers hamper new product introduction. In the 
view of some, slotting fees [and other costs of 
product introduction that are passed back by 
retailers] are simply barriers to entry. Still, a plausi­
ble economic argument can be made that such 
costs are compensation to retailers for the risk 
taken when a new, and possibly unsuccessful, 
product takes shelf space from an existing product 
of known performance.
In many countries, policy makers resolve to sup­
port, assist, and promote small and medium-sized 
firms. Some food-related policies are less demand­
ing of small firms than large ones, but many 
instruments of other policies [like food safety and 
environmental protection policies] demand high 
levels of capital and specialist labor, which large 
firms are clearly more able to provide than small 
ones. Where policies address the firm rather than 
the individual factory or site, then the case has 
been made that regulation encourages concentra­
tion by way of merger and acquisition. The fact 
that some mergers and acquisitions cross borders 
accentuates the concern that new entrants, partic­
ularly retailers, will bring their suppliers with them
and supplant domestic suppliers or force lower 
price regimes onto them.
In all countries, farmer cooperatives operate under 
selective policies that provide certain advantages 
over other agribusiness firms. Commercial advan­
tages include allowing income to be treated as non- 
taxable until distributed to members and exempting 
transactions between suppliers and the cooperative 
from most taxes. In terms of competition policy, 
cooperatives are commonly allowed to approach 
monopoly status in raw material purchase, product 
sales, and export supplies. At the farm level, this 
monopoly status is implemented through supplier 
contracts featuring exclusivity clauses that would 
be illegal in other commercial settings. It should be 
noted that such treatment of cooperatives is not 
necessarily the preserve of so-called cooperative 
law, as many countries featuring a powerful coop­
erative movement lack any such a law. In such cases 
the laws governing commerce can accommodate 
the cooperative business model.
The role played by food processing and other agri­
business in rural society is an area of current 
research. There is a widespread belief that agribusi­
ness is a significant employer in rural areas and a 
means of retaining added value in the region in 
which it is added. Concentration means that fewer 
firms are making fewer decisions about where to 
locate, so that much of relevant rural development 
policy is now concerned with presenting and pro­
moting potential locations to agribusiness firms. In 
turn, this effort to promote location of agribusi­
nesses in certain areas interfaces with policies such 
as transport and local taxation [which might 
encourage location] and preservation of rural land­
scapes, residents' protection from smells and noise, 
and heavy transport bans [which are designed for 
the opposite effect].
Protection of the countryside from retail greenfield 
development finds some common cause with small 
business owners in the "high streets" of towns and 
small cities. Retail facilities outside small towns take 
business, and businesses, away from these tradi­
tional locations. Where powerful retail firms have 
already purchased suitable land areas, then zoning 
and municipal planning responses may [1] be too 
late and [2] support the implied market power by 
restricting other firms' location options.
Policy Issues Surrounding Aria Foods
Aria Foods operates as a near monopoly, and a 
near monopsony, in Denmark and Sweden and 
maintains a dominant position in Britain. It has 
achieved this position through a process of 
mergers among cooperatives [in the Scandinavian 
countries] and joint ventures, partnerships, and 
mergers with other organizations elsewhere. Com­
petition authorities have, at various stages in Aria's 
development, reviewed these various mergers, part­
nerships, and acquisitions to ensure that society's 
best interests were being preserved. In practice this 
oversight has involved examining merger plans and 
requiring certain actions of the parties to the 
merger that would maintain competition.
Because Aria is a cooperative and is, to some 
extent, vertically integrated, some of the supplier- 
buyer policy issues do not arise. A cooperative is 
required, however, to operate according to its con­
stitution, which usually means farmer-member 
governance and influence over strategy, as well as 
generation of benefits to member-suppliers. Some 
Aria members have brought actions against Aria 
concerning its entry fees [which are now discon­
tinued). The policy issue is whether or not Aria 
employs its near monopsony status to extract 
higher entry fees than would be possible were a 
number of competing buyers of milk available.
Close associations with a supplier of auxiliary 
services [packaging) have also come under scrutiny. 
The policy issue is the extent to which Aria's own­
ership and control of dominant auxiliary firms 
prevent other firms from accessing similar 
products.
Aria is reported to have been found guilty of 
imposing exclusivity on a retail customer, at the 
expense of a rival supplier. Here, the policy issue is 
that the consumer's interest is best served by 
having products from numerous dairy processors 
on the shelves of as many retail shops as possible. 
Aria's actions not only prevented that outcome, 
but also deprived a competitor of a market for its 
products, thus inflicting financial damage on its 
farmer-suppliers.
It is notable that Aria produces own-label branded 
products for retail customers—particularly in the 
United Kingdom—alongside its own heavily brand- 
oriented marketing activities. This fact suggests that
Aria exerts limited market power over retailers, 
despite its substantial market share.
Stakeholders
In the context of concentration in the food indus­
try, stakeholders obviously include the members of 
the food marketing chain, consumers, and tax­
payers, who fund and benefit from the regulatory 
process. Within the food marketing chain, several 
spectra of interests exist that span ownership [as 
opposed to employment], sentiment, tradition, and 
ethics.
Less obvious connections extend to rural residents, 
users of shared resources [such as roads and water 
supplies], and pressure groups with a single agenda 
[such as anti-genetic modification or pro-organic] 
or multiple ones [such as quality of rural life or 
various animal welfare concerns],
A number of stakeholders are associated with Aria 
Foods. Consumers in many countries are stake­
holders in any change in Aria Foods' competitive 
position. This situation particularly applies to 
Denmark and Sweden, where few alternatives to 
Aria's products exist; the position in the United 
Kingdom is somewhat less extreme.
Scandinavian dairy farmers are stakeholders in 
Aria's development. Farmers within Aria have a 
financial stake in Aria's profitability, no matter 
what means are used to bring it about. Aria's 
existing members also have a stake in defending 
their benefits, so that if volumes of sales were 
static, they would have an incentive to prevent 
other farmers from joining. Farmers who are not 
suppliers to Aria have a stake in maintaining com­
petition because they require continued access to 
processing firms and to retail buyers of processed 
products. Farmers wishing to join Aria have a stake 
in ensuring that no barriers to entry exist.
Farmers in foreign countries have seen their own 
dairy-processing operations [whether cooperative 
or private) face competition from Aria, with the 
likely consequence of damage to milk prices. As 
one consequence, local dairy processing firms may 
be forced out of production of the most profitable 
dairy products and left with less lucrative alterna­
tives.
Retail buyers of dairy products have a stake in 
secure access to high-quality products at competi­
tive prices. In addition, retailers would prefer to 
offer consumers a choice from their shelves.
Rural communities are stakeholders in agro­
industrial change. Small, independent processing 
firms [including cooperatives] provide different 
kinds of employment and economic contributions 
than do large, vertically integrated organizations 
such as Aria. Given that Aria has supplanted almost 
all small dairy-processing plants in Denmark, that 
country's rural communities have had to adjust, 
and that adjustment has produced winners and 
losers.
Policy Options
The most obvious policy option available to regu­
lators of Aria is scrutiny, entailing monitoring of
• mergers, takeovers, acquisitions, and joint 
ventures;
• pricing;
• complaints and legal actions; and
• adherence to the cooperative constitution 
and relevant laws.
In dealing with such a persistent, dominant market 
force, policy makers might move to limit Aria's 
market share in the event of any new proposed 
mergers and acquisitions. Such a step would require 
legislators to define a maximum allowable market 
share and then defend that definition. Several com­
plicating factors would also arise: Should market 
share be defined over the EU as a whole [it is 
politically defined as a "single market"] or just for 
the three markets in which dominance is clear? 
Should market share be defined over all dairy 
products or just certain ones?
If Aria manages to increase its market share by 
increasing sales, without mergers and acquisitions, 
regulators have few options. An alternative, how­
ever, lies in the regulation of retailers. Retailers are 
already prohibited from exercising exclusivity in 
sourcing, and this prohibition may provide an 
opportunity to constrain Aria's market share, 
particularly if Aria is prohibited from acquiring 
competing firms. Contracts and other transactions 
might be regulated to prohibit product-tying
arrangements [requiring supply of one product 
with another], exclusivity of infrastructure and 
hardware, collaborative pricing arrangements, and 
other issues between Aria and its retail customers. 
Such policies may prove difficult to implement 
because compliance is difficult to ensure.
In the past, large, vertically integrated cooperatives 
have justified their size and influence as a counter­
weight to large and powerful retailers. Any policy 
steps taken to reduce Aria's ability to act as a 
counterweight to retailers would [I] face some well- 
founded and popular opposition and [2] require 
compensation of farmers that might exceed bene­
fits to consumers.
Another approach may be to prohibit Aria from 
operating in markets related to the ones in which it 
has achieved dominance. Aria might be excluded, 
for example, from markets for protein fractions, ice 
cream, or milk powder. Such an approach would 
require sales of Aria's by-products to competing 
firms, which would then be able to maintain a 
presence in the dairy industry in order to challenge 
Aria in the future.
In an extreme response, policy makers might 
require Aria to be broken up into separate and 
competing firms. This approach would be a tech­
nical challenge and would need to be formulated 
and implemented in a manner that did not disrupt 
supplies from farms and processors. The breakup 
might be regional, vertical [for example, involving 
separation of stages of processing and distribution], 
or market-by-market in a product sense.
Aria's dominance in Denmark and Sweden is 
strongest as a buyer of raw milk: it is a virtual 
monopsonist. This outcome has largely arisen, and 
been tolerated, because Aria is a cooperative. 
Future policy will need to examine whether cooper­
atives should be allowed to become monopsonists 
(which then eases their progress toward monopoly]. 
At present, policy treatment of cooperatives is 
poorly equipped to deal with such problems: 
Denmark has no cooperative law as such but makes 
provisions for cooperatives through their 
adherence to aspects of their own constitutions. 
Policies could, however, restrict the length of Aria's 
contracts with suppliers or remove its exclusivity 
with individual farmers. The EU has not yet 
developed a policy or legal construct for dealing 
with market dominance by cooperatives. Most
arguments in favor of cooperatives as defenders of 
farmers break down when the cooperative markets 
its products across borders to the detriment of 
foreign farmers.
More general policy options are also available to 
encourage rivalry with Aria. These options include 
supporting or subsidizing innovation, local 
employment, product promotion and market 
research and investing in value-adding activities. 
These instruments largely fall within regional 
development policy or support to science and 
industrial development. It should be noted that 
Aria cannot generally be excluded from taking 
advantage of such incentives, which may have the 
effect of reinforcing its dominant position. A  
possible exception is in policies targeted at small 
and medium-sized enterprises or those located in 
specified locations. Such an exception would be 
effective in countering Aria's dominance only 
where [1] a subsidiary of Aria was not eligible and 
[2] the eligible firms had sufficient size to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered on a 
national scale.
Governments are significant buyers of dairy 
products through their ownership of hospitals, 
schools, prisons, and other state facilities. Govern­
ments could encourage competitors to Aria by 
awarding supply contracts to them instead of to 
Aria. Implementing such a policy would require 
support from local authorities, many of whom 
operate competitive tendering arrangements and 
would be loathe to favor a high-priced bid over a 
low one. In rural areas, local state facilities like hos­
pitals and schools serve the families of farmers who 
may be suppliers to Aria and so object to its 
exclusion from their local market. In the long run, 
such farmers might be viewed as potential sources 
of milk for competing firms, but defections from 
Aria are not likely to occur in regional blocs that 
would provide a competitor with easy market 
entry.
Assignment
Your assignment is to suggest policy recommenda­
tions for the various levels of government [local 
Danish and British governments, national Danish 
and Swedish governments, and the European 
Commission] regarding the future of Aria and 
other large agribusiness firms. Assess the extent of
market power exercised by Aria, and decide which
stakeholders are likely to be affected by Aria's
exercise of market power in which ways.
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